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Abstract
Alternating-time temporal logics (ATL/ATL∗) rep-
resent a family of modal logics for reasoning
about agents’ strategic abilities in multiagent sys-
tems (MAS). The interpretations of ATL/ATL∗ over
the semantic model Concurrent Game Structures
(CGS) usually vary depending on the agents’ abil-
ities, for instance, perfect vs. imperfect informa-
tion, perfect vs. imperfect recall, resulting in a va-
riety of variants which have been studied exten-
sively in literature. However, they are defined at
the semantic level, which may limit modeling flex-
ibilities and may give counter-intuitive interpreta-
tions. To mitigate these issues, in this work, we pro-
pose to extend CGS with agents’ abilities and study
the new semantics of ATL/ATL∗ under this model.
We give PSACE/2EXPTIME model-checking al-
gorithms for ATL/ATL∗ and implement them as a
prototype tool. Experiment results show the practi-
cal feasibility of the approach.
1 Introduction
Multiagent systems (MAS) consisting of multiple au-
tonomous agents are a wide adopted paradigm of intelligent
systems. Game-based models and associated logics, as the
foundation of MAS, have received tremendous attention in
recent years. The seminar work [Alur et al., 2002] proposed
concurrent game structures (CGS) as the model of MAS and
alternating-time temporal logics (typically ATL and ATL∗) as
specification languages for expressing temporal goals. In a
nutshell, a CGS consists of multiple players which are used
to represent autonomous agents, components and the envi-
ronment. The model describes how the MAS evolves accord-
ing to the collective behavior of agents. ATL/ATL∗, an exten-
sion of the Computational Tree Logics (CTL/CTL∗), features
coalition modality 〈〈A〉〉. The formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ expresses the
property that the coalition (i.e. the agent group) A has a col-
lective strategy to achieve a certain goal specified by ϕ.
A series of extensions of ATL-like logics have been
studied which take different agents’ abilities into account.
These abilities typically include whether the agents can
identify the current state of the system completely or only
partially (perfect vs. imperfect information), and whether
the agents can memorize the whole history of observations
or simply part of them (perfect vs. imperfect recall). Dif-
ferent abilities usually induce distinct semantics of logics,
which are indeed necessary because of the versatility of
problem domains. These semantic variants and their model-
checking problems comprise subjects of active research
for almost two decades, to cite a few [Schobbens, 2004;
Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004; Ågotnes et al., 2007;
Dima and Tiplea, 2011; Bulling and Jamroga, 2011;
Laroussinie and Markey, 2015].
While the agents’ abilities play a prominent
role [Bulling and Jamroga, 2014], the semantics of ATL-like
logics only refers to them implicitly. In other words, the logic
per se does not specify what ability an agent has; instead
one can infer the ability an agent requires by examining the
goal specified in the logic. This approach, being elegant and
valuable to understand the relationship between different
abilities, suffers from a few shortcomings: (1) From the
modelling perspective, it is common in practice that agents in
an MAS vary in their abilities (for instance, agents modeling
sensors may not identify the complete state of system so
can only use strategies with imperfect information). When
building up a model, these abilities ought to be encoded
explicitly. Such modeling flexibility is not supported by exist-
ing formalisms. (2) From the semantic perspective, ATL-like
logics may exhibit some counter-intuitive semantics. 〈〈A〉〉ϕ
is interpreted as the coalition A has a collective strategy to
achieve the goal ϕ “no matter what the other agents do”
rather than “no matter which strategies the other agents
choose”, hence, neglects the (multi-player) game nature in
the evolution of MAS. For instance, when it comes to the
imperfect information/recall setting, only agents in the for-
mula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ are assumed to use imperfect information/recall
strategies, while the agents not in A may still use perfect
information and perfect recall strategies. Even worse, if the
coalition modalities are nested, the same agent may have
different abilities to fulfill the objectives specified in different
sub-formulae, which results in inconsistency. This phe-
nomenon has also been mentioned in [Mogavero et al., 2014;
Cerma´k et al., 2014] which proposed a strategic logic does
make explicit references to strategies of all agents including
those not in A. However, all agents in strategic logic should
have same abilities.
To summarize, it occurs to us that the current approach in
which the temporal formulae are with implicit agents’ abili-
ties at the semantics level impedes necessary modeling flexi-
bility and often yields unpleasant (even weird) semantics. In-
stead, we argue that coupling agents’ abilities at the syntac-
tic level of system models would deliver a potentially better
approach to overcome the aforementioned limitations. Bear-
ing the rationale in mind, we propose a new MAS model,
named Agents’ Abilities Augmented Concurrent Game Struc-
tures (ACGS), which encompasses agents’ abilities explicitly.
We investigate ATL/ATL∗ over ACGS. We show that in
general the new semantics of ATL/ATL∗ over ACGS is in-
comparable with others even if the underlying CGS models
are the same. We also study the model-checking problem of
ATL/ATL∗ over ACGS. We show that this problem is gener-
ally undecidable, as the problem of ATL over CGS under the
imperfect information and perfect recall setting is already un-
decidable [Dima and Tiplea, 2011]. However, we manage to
show that the model-checking problem for ATL∗ (resp. ATL)
on ACGS is 2EXPTIME-complete (resp. in PSPACE) when
the imperfect information and perfect recall strategies are dis-
allowed.We implement our algorithms in a prototype tool and
conduct experiments on some standard applications from the
literature. The results confirm the feasibility of our approach.
The source code of our tool is available
at [MCMAS-ACGS, 2018] which also includes some
further experiments and comparison of ATL/ATL∗ semantics
between CGS and ACGS.
2 Concurrent Game Structures
Given an infinite word ρ = s0s1 . . ., we denote by ρ j the sym-
bol s j, ρ[0.. j] the prefix s0 . . . s j, and ρ[ j..∞] the suffix s js j+1 . . ..
Given a finite word ρ = s0s1 · · · sm, we denote by ρ j the sym-
bol s j for 0 ≤ j ≤ m, and lst(ρ) the symbol sm.
Let AP denote a finite set of atomic propositions. A con-
current game structure (CGS) is a tuple
G , (S , S 0, Ag, (Aci)i∈Ag, (∼i)i∈Ag, (Pi)i∈Ag,∆, λ),
where S is a finite set of states; S 0 ⊆ S is a set of initial
states; Ag = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of agents; Aci is a finite
set of local actions of agent i; ∼i⊆ S × S is an epistemic ac-
cessibility relation (an equivalence relation); Pi : S → 2Aci is
a protocol function such that Pi(s) = Pi(s′) for every s ∼i s′;
∆ : S × Ac → S is a transition function with Ac =
∏
i∈Ag Aci
being a set of joint actions; and λ : S → 2AP is a labeling
function which assigns each state with a set of atomic propo-
sitions. Given a joint action ~a = 〈a1, ..., an〉 ∈ Ac, we use ~a(i)
to denote the local action of agent i in ~a.
A path is an infinite sequence of states ρ = s0s1 . . .
such that for every j ≥ 0, s j+1 = ∆(s j, ~a j) for some ~a j ∈∏
i∈Ag Pi(s j). Two sequences ρ = s0 . . . sm ∈ S
+ and ρ′ =
s′0 . . . s
′
m ∈ S
+ are indistinguishable for agent i, denoted by
ρ ∼i ρ
′, if for every j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m, s j ∼i s′j.
Strategies. Typical agents’ abilities are captured by the fol-
lowing types of strategies [Schobbens, 2004]. For i ∈ Ag,
Ir-strategy θi : S → Ac with ∀s ∈ S , θi(s) ∈ Pi(s);
IR-strategy θi : S + → Ac with ∀ρ ∈ S +, θi(ρ) ∈ Pi(lst(ρ));
ir-strategy θi : S → Ac, the same as the Ir-strategy but
with the additional constraint s ∼i s′ ⇒ θi(s) = θi(s′);
iR-strategy θi : S + → Ac, the same as the IR-strategy but
with the additional constraint ρ ∼i ρ′ ⇒ θi(ρ) = θi(ρ′).
Intuitively, i (resp. I) signals that agents can only observe
partial information characterized via epistemic accessibility
relations (resp. complete information with all epistemic ac-
cessibility relations being the identity relation), while r (resp.
R) signals that agents can make decision based on the cur-
rent observation (resp. the whole history of observations).We
will, by slightly abusing notation, extend Ir-strategies and
ir-strategies θi to the domain S + such that for all ρ ∈ S +,
θi(ρ) = θi(lst(ρ)). We denote by Θσi for σ ∈ {Ir, IR, ir, iR}
the set of σ-strategies for agent i.
Outcomes. A collective σ-strategy of a set of agents A is
a function υσ
A
assigning each agent i ∈ A with a σ-strategy
υσ
A
(i) ∈ Θσ
i
. For i ∈ A and ρ ∈ S +, we denote the local action
υσ
A
(i)(ρ) of agent i by υσ
A
(i, ρ), and the set Ag \ A by A.
Given a state s, two collective σ/σ′-strategies υσ
A
and υσ
′
A
yield a path ρ, denoted by play(s, υσ
A
, υσ
′
A
), where ρ0 = s and
for every j ≥ 0, ρ j+1 = ∆(ρ j, ~a j), ~a j(i) = υσA(i, ρ[0.. j]) for i ∈ A
and ~a j(i) = υσ
′
A
(i, ρ[0.. j]) for i ∈ A.
For every state s ∈ S and collective σ-strategy υσ
A
of A, the
outcome function is defined as follows:
Oσ
G
(s, υσ
A
) , {play(s, υσ
A
, υIR
A
) | ∀i ∈ A, υIR
A
(i) ∈ ΘIR
i
},
i.e., the set of all possible plays that may occur when each
agent i ∈ A enforces its σ-strategy υσ
A
(i) from the state s. The
subscriptG is dropped inOσ
G
when it is clear from the context.
3 Alternating-Time Temporal Logics
The alternating-time temporal logic ATL/ATL∗ is an exten-
sion of the branching-time logic CTL/CTL∗ by replacing
the existential path quantifiers E with coalition modalities
〈〈A〉〉 [Alur et al., 2002]. Intuitively, the formula 〈〈A〉〉φ ex-
presses that the set of agents A has a collective strategy to
achieve the goal φ no matter which strategies the agents in A
choose. Formally, ATL∗ is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= q | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉φ
φ ::= ϕ | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | X φ | φ U φ
where ϕ (resp. φ) denotes state (resp. path) formulae, q ∈ AP
and A ⊆ Ag.
The derived operators are defined as usual: φ1 → φ2 ,
φ2 ∨ ¬φ1, F φ , true U φ, G φ , ¬F ¬φ, φ1 R φ2 , Gφ2 ∨
φ2U(φ1 ∧ φ2), and [[A]]φ , ¬〈〈A〉〉¬φ. An LTL formula is an
ATL∗ path formula by restricting ϕ to atomic propositions.
The semantics of ATL∗ is traditionally defined over CGS.
When agents’s abilities are considered, it is often parame-
terized with a strategy type σ ∈ Tstr, denoted by ATL∗σ
[Bulling and Jamroga, 2014]. Formally, let G be a CGS and
s be a state of G, the semantics of ATL∗σ (i.e. the satisfaction
relation) is defined inductively as follows: (where ̺ is a state
s or path ρ)
• G, s |=σ q iff q ∈ λ(s);
• G, s |=σ 〈〈A〉〉φ iff there exists a collective σ-strategy υσA
of agents A such that ∀ρ ∈ Oσ(s, υσ
A
), G, ρ |=σ φ;
• G, ρ |=σ ϕ iff G, ρ0 |=σ ϕ;
• G, ρ |=σ Xφ iff G, ρ[1..∞] |=σ φ;
• G, ρ |=σ φ1Uφ2 iff ∃k ≥ 0 such that G, ρ[k..∞] |= φ2 and
∀ j : 0 ≤ j < k, G, ρ[ j..∞] |=σ φ1;
• G, ̺ |=σ φ1 ∧ φ2 iff G, ̺ |=σ φ1 and G, ̺ |=σ φ2;
• G, ̺ |=σ ¬φ iff G, ̺ 6|=σ φ.
Vanilla ATL. ATL is a sublogic of ATL∗ where each occur-
rence of the coalition modality 〈〈A〉〉 is immediately followed
by a temporal operator. Formally, ATL is defined by the fol-
lowing grammar:
ϕ ::= q | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉X ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉[ϕRϕ] | 〈〈A〉〉[ϕ U ϕ]
where q ∈ A and A ⊆ Ag.
Remark that the operator R cannot be defined us-
ing other operators in ATL with imperfect informa-
tion [Laroussinie et al., 2008], so is included for complete-
ness.
Given an ATL∗ formula ϕ, a CGS G and a strategy typeσ ∈
Tstr, the model-checking problem is to determine whether
G, s |=σ ϕ or not, for each initial state s of the CGS G.
Some Semantic Issues. We observe that the semantics of
ATL/ATL∗ refers to the agents’ abilities in an implicit man-
ner. For the formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, the specified σ-strategies only
apply to agents in A while the agents in A could still choose
beyond σ-strategies (e.g. IR-strategies). In other words, A
has a collective σ-strategy to achieve ϕ no matter what the
other agents do. When σ is IR as in the original work
by [Alur et al., 2002], this interpretation of 〈〈A〉〉ϕ is plausi-
ble, as “no matter what the other agents do” is effectively the
same as “no matter which strategies the other agents choose”.
However, when σ is set to be more restricted than IR, agents
not in A are still allowed to use IR-strategies.
As mentioned in the introduction, this results in a few
shortcomings. From a modeling perspective, arguably agents’
abilities should be decided by the practical scenario. Namely,
they should be fixed when the model is built, and all agents
stick to their respective abilities independent of logic formu-
lae. More concretely, from the semantic perspective, the ex-
isting semantics does not take into account the abilities of
agents who are not in A, and neglects the (multi-player) game
nature in the evolution of MAS. As a result, it may exhibit
some counter-intuitive semantics. For instance, consider two
formulae 〈〈A〉〉φ and 〈〈A′〉〉φ′ such that agent i ∈ A \ A′, i
may have different abilities to achieve φ and φ′. Let us con-
sider an autonomous road vehicle scenario to see why this is
not ideal. There are several autonomous cars which can only
observe partial information and have bounded memory. An
MAS model G consists of agents in A modeling autonomous
cars, and an additional environment agent e. We can reason-
ably assume that all the car agents use ir-strategies, while
e uses IR-strategies. The property 〈〈A′〉〉φ expresses that au-
tonomous cars A′ ⊂ A can cooperatively achieve the goal φ
no matter what strategies the other cars and the environment
choose. Verifying that G satisfies 〈〈A′〉〉φ under the existing
semantics would allow car agents A\A′ to use IR-strategies. If
G satisfies 〈〈A′〉〉φ, then the result is conclusive, i.e., 〈〈A′〉〉φ
holds for the system. However, if G invalidates 〈〈A′〉〉φ, we
cannot deduce that 〈〈A′〉〉φ fails because we overestimate the
abilities of agents in A \ A′ when evaluating 〈〈A′〉〉φ. In other
words, for the formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ under |=σ where σ , IR, it
seems to be inappropriate to render the agents not in A extra
powers of IR to potentially defeat agents from A when their
abilities are actually much weaker.
4 Agents’ Abilities Augmented Concurrent
Game Structures
In this section, we introduce agents’ abilities augmented con-
current game structures (ACGS in short), which explicitly
equip each agent with a strategy type from Tstr. As such,
agents have fixed abilities throughout their lives for a given
CGS. Formally, an ACGS is a pairM , (G, π), where G is a
CGS and π : Ag → Tstr is a function that assigns a strategy
type π(i) to the agent i. We assume that, for each agent i ∈ Ag
with π(i) ∈ {IR, Ir}, ∼i is an identity relation, as agents with
perfect information should be able to distinguish two distinct
states. Paths ofM are defined the same as for the CGS G, but
strategies and outcomes ofM have to be redefined as follows.
Strategies and Outcomes. Let A be a set of agents. A col-
lective strategy of A in M is a function ξA that assigns each
agent i ∈ A with a π(i)-strategy ξA(i) ∈ Θ
π(i)
i
.
Given a state s ∈ S , for every collective strategy ξA of the
set A of agents, the outcome OM(s, ξA) ofM is the set of all
possible paths that may occur when each agent i ∈ A enforces
its π(i)-strategy ξA(i) from state s, and other agents i ∈ A can
only choose π(i)-strategies instead of general IR-strategies.
Formally, OM(s, ξA) is defined as
OM(s, ξA) , {play(s′, ξA, ξA) | ∀i ∈ A, ξA(i) ∈ Θ
π(i)
i
}
We will omit the subscriptM from OM(s, ξA) when it is clear
from context.
Semantics of ATL/ATL∗. The difference of outcomes be-
tween ACGS and CGS induces a distinct semantics of ATL∗
on ACGS than CGS. Let M be an ACGS and s be a state in
M, the semantics of ATL∗ onM is defined similar to the one
on CGS, except that the semantics of the state formulae of the
form 〈〈A〉〉φ is defined as follows:
M, s |= 〈〈A〉〉φ iff there exists a collective strategy
ξA of A such thatM, ρ |= φ for all ρ ∈ O(s, ξA).
Remark that this semantics takes into account whether the
agents from A have perfect or imperfect information/recall.
Given an ACGS M and an ATL/ATL∗ formula ϕ, the
model-checking problem is to determine whether M, s |= ϕ
holds, for every initial state s of G. Given a state formula ϕ,
let ~ϕM denote the set of all the states ofM that satisfies ϕ.
The semantics of ATL/ATL∗ defined on ACGS is different
from the one defined on CGS, hence they are incomparable.
Proposition 1 There are an ACGSM = (G, π), an ATL/ATL∗
formula 〈〈A〉〉φ, and a type σ ∈ Tstr such that π(i) = σ for
all i ∈ A andM, s |= 〈〈A〉〉φ holds, but G, s 6|=σ 〈〈A〉〉φ.
Proof. Let us consider the CGS shown in Figure 1. There are
two agents {1, 2}, four states {s0, s1, s2, s3} (s0 is the initial
state), λ(s0) = λ(s1) = λ(s2) = {q} and λ(s3) = ∅, ∼1 is
s0start
s1 s2
s3
(a, b1) (a, b2)
(a, b1)
(a, b2)
(a, ⋆)
(a, b2)
(a, b1)
Figure 1: An illustrating example, where ⋆ ∈ {b1, b2}.
the identity relation, s ∼2 s′ for every s, s′ ∈ {s0, s1, s2} and
s3 ∼2 s3. Consider the function π such that π(1) = IR and
π(2) = ir, it is easy to see that M, s0 |= 〈〈{1}〉〉Gq, while
G, s0 6|=IR 〈〈{1}〉〉Gq. ⊓⊔
5 Model-Checking Algorithms
It has been shown that the Turing Halting problem can
be reduced to the model-checking problem of CGS against
the ATL formula ϕ = 〈〈{1, 2}〉〉G ok under the iR set-
ting [Dima and Tiplea, 2011], where ok is an atomic propo-
sition. By adapting the proof, we get that:
Theorem 1 The model-checking problem for ACGS M =
(G, π) against the ATL/ATL∗ formula 〈〈{1, 2}〉〉G ok is unde-
cidable, where {1, 2, 3} ⊆ Ag, π(1) = π(2) = iR and π(i) = IR
for i ∈ Ag \ {1, 2}.
By Theorem 1, we focus on the model-checking problem
of ACGS by restricting the function π to Ag → Tstr \ {iR}.
In general, we propose model-checking algorithms which it-
eratively compute the set of states satisfying state formulae
from the innermost subformulae. The main challenge is to
compute ~〈〈A〉〉φM. To this end, we first show how to com-
pute ~〈〈A〉〉φM for a simple formula 〈〈A〉〉φ, and then present
the more general algorithm. An ATL/ATL∗ formula 〈〈A〉〉φ is
called simple if φ is an LTL formula.
Let us fix an ACGS M = (G, π) with G =
(S , S 0, Ag, (Aci)i∈Ag, (∼i)i∈Ag, (Pi)i∈Ag,∆, λ) and a simple for-
mula 〈〈A〉〉φ. Given a set of agents A′ and a strategy type
σ ∈ Tstr, we denote by A′σ the set {i ∈ A
′ | π(i) = σ}.
5.1 Model-Checking Simple ATL Formulae
For a simple ATL formula 〈〈A〉〉φ, it is easy to see that
whether agents in A have perfect call or not does not matter if
these agents have perfect information abilities.
Proposition 2 Given an ACGS (G, π) with π : Ag → Tstr \
{iR}, and a simple ATL formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, let π′ be a function
such that for every i ∈ Ag, π′(i) = Ir if π(i) = IR and i ∈ A,
otherwise π′(i) = π(i). For every state s inM,
(G, π), s |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff (G, π′), s |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ.
By Proposition 2, all the agents in A with IR-strategies can
be seen as agents with Ir-strategies. All the agents in Agwith
Ir-strategies can be seen as agents with ir-strategies (i.e.,
all the epistemic accessibility relations of them are the iden-
tity relation). Therefore, we can assume that π(i) = ir for
all i ∈ A, and π(i) ∈ {ir, IR} for all i ∈ A. For two collec-
tive strategies ξA and ξAir , let M(ξA, ξAir) = (G
′, π) be the
ACGS obtained from (G, π) by enforcing strategies ξA and
ξAir , namely, by removing transitions whose actions of agents
in A ∪ Air do not conform to ξA and ξAir . We have that
~〈〈A〉〉φM ≡
⋃
ξA
⋂
ξAir
~〈〈∅〉〉φM(ξA,ξAir )
.
Computing ~〈〈∅〉〉φM(ξA ,ξAir ) amounts to CTL model-
checking, which can be done in polynomial time (and
thus in polynomial space) in the size of M(ξA, ξAir) and
〈〈∅〉〉φ [Clarke et al., 1983]. Since the number of strategies ξA
and ξAir is finite, we get that:
Lemma 1 For the simple ATL formula 〈〈A〉〉φ, ~〈〈A〉〉φM
can be computed in PSPACE.
5.2 Model-Checking Simple ATL∗ Formulae
We compute ~〈〈A〉〉φM by a reduction to the problem of
computing the winning region of a turn-based two-player par-
ity game. We first introduce some basic concepts which will
be used in our reduction.
A deterministic parity automaton (DPA) is a tuple A =
(P,Σ, δ, p0,R), where P is a finite set of states, Σ is the input
alphabet, δ : P × Σ→ P is a transition function, p0 ∈ P is the
initial state and R : P → {0, ..., k} is a rank function. A run ρ
of A over an ω-word α0α1... ∈ Σω is an infinite sequence of
states ρ = p0p1... such that for every i ≥ 0, pi+1 = δ(pi, αi).
Let inf(ρ) be the set of states visited infinitely often in ρ. An
infinite word is recognized by A if A has a run ρ over this
word such that minp∈inf(ρ) R(p) is even. For the LTL formula
φ, one can construct a DPA Aφ = (P, 2AP, δ, p0,R) with 22
O(|φ|)
states and rank k = 2O(|φ|) such that Aφ recognizes all the
ω-words satisfying φ [Piterman, 2006].
A (turned-based, two-player) parity gameP is a tuple (V =
V0 ⊎ V1, E,Ξ), where Vi for i ∈ {0, 1} is a finite set of vertices
controlled by Player-i, E ⊆ V × V is a finite set of edges,
and Ξ : V → {0, ..., k} is a rank function. A play ρ starting
from v0 is an infinite sequence of vertices v0v1... such that for
every i ≥ 0, (vi, vi+1) ∈ E. A strategy of Player-i is a function
θ : V∗Vi → V such that for every ρ ∈ V∗ and v ∈ Vi, (v, θ(ρ ·
v)) ∈ E. Given a strategy θ0 for Player-0 and a strategy θ1 for
Player-1, let Gθ0,θ1 be the play where Player-0 and Player-1
enforce their strategies θ0 and θ1. θ0 is a winning strategy for
Player-0 if mins∈inf(Gθ0 ,θ1 ) Ξ(s) is even for every strategy θ1 of
Player-1. The winning region of Player-0, denoted byWR0, is
the set of vertices fromwhich Player-0 has a winning strategy.
A partial strategy of A′ is a partial function f : A′ × S →⋃
i∈A′ Aci such that for each i ∈ A
′ and s ∈ S , if f (i, s) is
defined, then for all s′ ∈ S with s ∼i s′, f (i, s) = f (i, s′) ∈
Pi(s). We denote by dom( f ) the domain of f . Let Fir (resp.
Gir) be the set of partial strategies of Air (resp. Air). Let F⊤ir
denote the set { f ∈ Fir | dom( f ) = Air × S }, and g⊥ ∈ Gir
denote the partial strategy such that dom(g⊥) = ∅. Given a
state s, let F s
IR
be the set of functions f : AIR →
⋃
i∈AIR
Aci
such that for every i ∈ AIR, f (i) ∈ Pi(s). Let FIR :=
⋃
s∈S F
s
IR
and Πir := {G ⊆ Gir | ∀g, g′ ∈ G. dom(g) = dom(g′)}.
We define a parity game Pφ , (V = V0 ⊎ V1, E,Ξ), where
V0 = S ∪ (S × P × F⊤ir × Πir), V1 = (S × F
⊤
ir
) ∪ (S × P ×
F⊤
ir
× FIR × Πir), Ξ : V → {0, · · · , k} is a function such that
for every s ∈ S ,
• Ξ(s) = Ξ(s, f⊤) = 0, ∀ f⊤ ∈ F⊤ir,
• Ξ(s, p, f⊤,G) = Ξ(s, p, f⊤, f ,G) = R(p), ∀p ∈ P, ∀ f⊤ ∈
F⊤
ir
, ∀ f ∈ FIR and ∀G ∈ Πir,
E is defined as follows:
• (s, (s, f⊤)) ∈ E for s ∈ S and f⊤ ∈ F⊤ir;
• ((s, f⊤), (s, p0, f⊤, {g⊥})) ∈ E for s ∈ S and f⊤ ∈ F⊤ir;
• ((s, p, f⊤,G), (s, p, f⊤, f ,G)) ∈ E for (s, p, f⊤,G) ∈ V0
and f ∈ F s
IR
;
• ((s, p, f⊤, f ,G), (s′, δ(p, λ(s)), f⊤,G′)) ∈ E for every
(s, p, f⊤, f ,G) ∈ V1 and s′ ∈ S , where G′ ⊆ Πir is the
largest set such that the follows hold: for every g′ ∈ G′,
1. there exists g ∈ G such that dom(g′) = dom(g) ∪
{(i, s′′) ∈ Air × S | s ∼i s′′} and for every (i, s′′) ∈
dom(g), g′(i, s′′) = g(i, s′′);
2. there exists ~a ∈ Ac such that s′ = ∆(s, ~a), and
∀i ∈ Ag, ((i, s) ∈ dom( f⊤) ⇒ ~ai = f⊤(i, s)) ∧ (i ∈
dom( f ) ⇒ ~ai = f (i)) ∧ ((i, s) ∈ dom(g′) ⇒ ~ai =
g′(i, s)).
In this reduction, f⊤ encodes a collective ir-strategy of
agents in Air, the collection of f ’s in one play of Pφ encodes
a collective IR-strategy of agents in AIR, and each g ∈ G en-
codes a collective ir-strategy of agents in Air. The imperfect
information abilities of agents are ensured by the definitions
partial strategies.
To check whether s ∈ ~〈〈A〉〉φM, Pφ starts with the ver-
tex s. At first step, Player-0 chooses a function f⊤ ∈ F⊤ir
meaning that all agents in Air choose an ir-strategy. Next,
Pφ moves from (s, f⊤) to (s, p0, f⊤, {g⊥}) which let the DPA
Aφ start with p0 (note that Player-1 has only one choice
at this step). At a vertex (s, p, f⊤,G) controlled by Player-
0, Player-0 chooses actions for agents in AIR by choosing
one function f ∈ F s
IR
. Then Player-1 chooses actions for
agents in A with respect to the chosen actions of agents in
Air tracked byG. These selections of actions together with f⊤
and G determine a joint action ~a, based on which Pφ moves
to (s′, δ(p, λ(s)), f⊤,G′) such that s′ is the next state of s un-
der ~a, δ(p, λ(s)) is the next state of p in Aφ which allows to
mimics the run of Aφ over the ω-word induced by the play
of M. During this step, f is dropped from the vertex of Pφ,
as f corresponds to actions of agents in AIR and needs not to
track. The actions of agents in Air are tracked by computing
G′ fromG. This ensures imperfect recall abilities of agents in
Air. We then can get that:
Lemma 2 WR0 ∩ S = ~〈〈A〉〉φM.
The winning region of Player-0 in Pφ can be computed in
polynomial time of |V | · |E| · 2k [Jurdzinski, 2000]. In this re-
duction, each G contributes at most O(|S |) sets of G′. There-
fore, |V | · |E| is exponential in |G| · 2|φ|. Recall that k = 2O(|φ|).
Consequently, we have
Lemma 3 For the simple ATL∗ formula 〈〈A〉〉φ, ~〈〈A〉〉φM
can be computed in 2EXPTIME.
Algorithm 1: Function MC(M, ϕ) outputs ~ϕM
1 switch ϕ :
2 case q : return {s ∈ S | q ∈ λ(s)};
3 case ¬ϕ′ : return S \ MC(M, ϕ′);
4 case ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 : return MC(M, ϕ1) ∩ MC(M, ϕ2);
5 case Kiϕ
′ : return {s ∈ S | [s]∼i ⊆ MC(M, ϕ′)};
6 case EAϕ
′ : return {s ∈ S | [s]∼
E
A ⊆ MC(M, ϕ′)};
7 case DAϕ
′ : return {s ∈ S | [s]∼
D
A ⊆ MC(M, ϕ′)};
8 case CAϕ
′ : return {s ∈ S | [s]∼
C
A ⊆ MC(M, ϕ′)};
9 case 〈〈A〉〉φ :
10 foreach sub-state-formula ϕ′ in φ do
11 Replace ϕ′ by a fresh atomic proposition qϕ′
in ϕ, and let λ(qϕ′) := MC(M, ϕ′);
12 Compute ~〈〈A〉〉φM by Lemma 1 or 3;
13 return ~〈〈A〉〉φM;
5.3 The Overall Algorithm
We now present the overall procedure, which com-
putes ~ϕM from the innermost subformulae. Algo-
rithm 1 shows the pseudo code, which takes an ACGS
M = (G, π) and an ATL/ATL∗ formula ϕ as inputs,
and outputs ~ϕM. Then M satisfies ϕ iff the set of
initial states of M is a subset of ~ϕM. We also in-
corporate epistemic modalities Kiϕ,EAϕ,DAϕ,CAϕ
from [van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003;
Cerma´k et al., 2014] into our algorithm with the following
semantics:
• G, s |=σ Kiϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S , s ∼i s′ =⇒ G, s′ |=σ ϕ;
• G, s |=σ EAϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S , s ∼EA s
′ =⇒ G, s′ |=σ ϕ;
• G, s |=σ DAϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S , s ∼DA s
′ =⇒ G, s′ |=σ ϕ;
• G, s |=σ CAϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S , s ∼CA s
′ =⇒ G, s′ |=σ ϕ;
where ϕ is a state formula, ∼E
A
=
⋃
i∈A ∼i, ∼
D
A
=
⋂
i∈A ∼i,
∼C
A
= (∼E
A
)+ (note that (∼E
A
)+ is the transitive closure of ∼E
A
).
Kiϕ,EAϕ,DAϕ and CAϕ respectively denote that i knows, ev-
ery agent in A knows, agents in A have common knowledge
and agents in A have distributed knowledge, on the fact ϕ.
The ATL (resp. ATL∗) logic extended with these epistemic
modalities is called ATLK (resp. ATLK∗) logic. Given a state
s ∈ S and a binary relation ⋍⊆ S × S , we denote by [s]⋍ the
set {s′ ∈ S | s ⋍ s′}.
By Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, the model-checking problem
for ATLK and ATLK∗ on ACGS can be solved in PSPACE
and 2EXPTIME respectively. As the model-checking prob-
lem of ATL∗ on CGS under IR setting is 2EXPTIME-
complete [Alur et al., 2002], we have that
Theorem 2 The model-checking problem for ATLK∗ (resp.
ATLK) on ACGS is 2EXPTIME-complete (resp. in PSPACE).
6 Implementation and Experiments
We have implemented the ATLK/ATLK∗ model-checking al-
gorithms in MCMAS [Lomuscio et al., 2017]. We conducted
experiments on the castle game (CG) [Pilecki et al., 2014].
Table 1: Results of the castle game
π
ϕ1 ϕ2
Lem. 1 Lem. 3 SAT Lem. 1 Lem. 3 SAT
(IR, IR, IR, IR) N/A 20.295 Y N/A 18.178 Y
(IR, IR, IR, ir) N/A 7523.67 Y N/A 7377.44 Y
(IR, IR, ir, IR) N/A 31.904 Y N/A 30.578 N
(IR, ir, IR, IR) N/A 32.446 Y N/A 31.259 N
(IR, IR, ir, ir) N/A 3402.56 Y N/A 3451.59 N
(IR, ir, IR, ir) N/A 3294.51 Y N/A 3366.71 N
(IR, ir, ir, IR) 5.822 24.254 Y 77.514 23.37 N
(IR, ir, ir, ir) 13.791 113.493 Y 45.679 113.647 N
All experimentswere conducted on a computerwith 1.70GHz
Intel Core E5-2603 CPU and 32GB of memory.
In this CG game, there are several agents modelling work-
ers and an environment agent. Each worker works for the ben-
efit of a castle, and the environment keeps track of the Health
Points (HP) of castles. Each castle preserves an HP valued up
to 3, and 0 means it’s defeated. Workers are able to attack a
castle which they don’t work for, or defend the castle which
they work for, or do nothing. The castle gets damaged if the
number of attackers is greater than the number of defenders,
and the differences influence its HP. In this model, the num-
ber of states is 8000 × 4n, the environment agent has 1 local
action, and each worker agent has 4 local actions, where n
denotes the number of workers.
In this experiment, we consider ACGS consisting of three
worker agents w1,w2,w3 and an environment agent e, where
worker wi works for the castle ci.
• ϕ1 ≡ 〈〈{w1,w2}〉〉F(castle3De f eated): expresses that
workers w1 and w2 can make castle c3 defeated, no mat-
ter which strategies other agents use.
• ϕ2 ≡ 〈〈{w1,w2}〉〉F(allDe f eated): expresses that work-
ers w1 and w2 can make all the castles defeated, no mat-
ter which strategies other agents use.
The results are shown in Table 1, where (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4) in
each row denotes the strategy types of agents e,w1,w2,w3,
N/A denotes timeout (2.5 hours), Y (resp. N) denotes that
the model satisfies (resp. fails) the formula, and columns 2–4
(resp. 5–7) show total time (in seconds) and result of verifying
ϕ1 (resp. ϕ2) using Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 respectively.
We observe that: (1) the strategy types of agents do affect
the performance and results. In particular, the time signifi-
cantly increases when w3 is ir-typed while w1 or w2 is IR-
typed; (2) Lemma 1 is more efficient when both w1 and w2
are ir-typed; otherwise Lemma 3 is more efficient. This is
because the number of possible strategies of w1 and w2 is
small (using Lemma 1) if both w1 and w2 are ir-typed.
Further experiments (on the Book Store
Application and Dining Cryptographers Pro-
tocol [Lomuscio et al., 2017]) can be found
in [MCMAS-ACGS, 2018].
7 Related Work
The family of alternating-time temporal logics ATL, ATL∗
and alternating µ-calculus (AMC) [Alur et al., 2002] for rea-
soning about games was introduced with motivations par-
tially fromMAS. Model-checking algorithmswere also given
with IR-strategies. [van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003] ex-
tended ATL with knowledge operators and proposed corre-
sponding model-checking algorithms. In their work, epis-
temic accessibility relations are considered in the interpre-
tation of knowledge operators, but not for the strategies
and outcomes. This means that agents still use IR strate-
gies for coalition modalities 〈〈A〉〉ψ. This issue was dis-
cussed in [Jamroga, 2003] which proposed an idea of iR-
strategies. [Schobbens, 2004] introduced the notion of im-
perfect recall into ATL/ATL∗, and investigated the model-
checking problem for ATL/ATL∗ under four different strate-
gic types. Importantly, with iR-strategies the model-checking
problem becomes undecidable [Dima and Tiplea, 2011].
[Bulling and Jamroga, 2011] studied the semantics of AMC
and proposed a model-checking algorithm for the alternation-
free fragment under the imperfect information setting.
[Bulling and Jamroga, 2014] further conducted a comprehen-
sive comparison of variants of ATL/ATL∗ with different
strategic types. The study corroborate that the agents’ abili-
ties play a prominent role in logic semantics.
In the previous work, strategies are revocable, i.e.,
when it comes to achieve a goal in the (nested)
sub-formula, previously selected strategies are deleted.
[Ågotnes et al., 2007] introduced a variant of ATL with
irrevocable strategies under the imperfect recall setting.
It was generalized into ATL/ATL∗ with strategy con-
texts [Laroussinie and Markey, 2015], which allows agents to
drop or inherit previously selected strategies.
Two strategic logics were introduced
by [Chatterjee et al., 2010] and [Mogavero et al., 2014]
and the model-checking problem was investigated therein
under the IR-setting. Strategic logics extend LTL with
first-order quantifications over strategies which naturally
captures the multi-player game nature in the evolution of
MAS. [Cerma´k et al., 2014] introduced knowledge oper-
ators in the strategic logic of [Mogavero et al., 2014] and
proposed a model-checking algorithm with ir-strategies.
Here all agents must take ir-strategies (so the potential
inconsistency can be ruled out), but no other abilities
are considered. To gain decidability under iR-setting,
specific restrictions on the abilities of the agents were
proposed [Berthon et al., 2017a; Berthon et al., 2017b;
Belardinelli et al., 2017a; Belardinelli et al., 2017b;
Belardinelli et al., 2018].
Our work is orthogonal to the existing work which defines
the agents’ abilities at the semantics level, but takes a more
syntactic level by strengthening the model.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we discussed the problem of existing semantics
of ATL/ATL∗, and advocated the approach to make agents’
abilities explicit in modeling. For this purpose, we introduced
an extension of standard CGSmodel, i.e. ACGS, which define
agents’ abilities at the syntactic level of the systemmodel.We
explored the effects of strategy types in the semantics, in par-
ticular model-checking, of ATL/ ATL∗ over ACGS, and pro-
vided model-checking algorithms with identified complexity.
The algorithms are implemented in a tool MCMAS-ACGS,
which has been applied to several applications to demonstrate
the feasibility of the approach. This work represents the first
systematic study towards different agents’ abilities at the syn-
tactic level, which is in contrast to the previous approaches at
the semantic level.
Currently we use ATL/ATL∗ as the specification, but the
methodology can be extended to other logics such as Strategy
Logic, and other agents’ abilities such as strategy contexts.
Several questions are left open such as axiomatization and
satisfiability problem. We leave them for future work.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Given a Turing machine M, let G = (S , {s0}, Ag, (Aci)i∈Ag, (∼i)i∈Ag, (Pi)i∈Ag,∆, λ) be the CGS constructed as
in [Dima and Tiplea, 2011] and s0 be an initial state in G such that G, s0 |=iR 〈〈{1, 2}〉〉G ok iff M does not halt on the empty
word. Let M = (G, π) be an ACGS such that for every agent i in M, π(i) = iR if i ∈ {1, 2}, otherwise π(i) = IR. Therefore,
G, s0 |=iR 〈〈{1, 2}〉〉G ok iffM, s0 |= 〈〈{1, 2}〉〉G ok. The result immediately follows.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Without loss of generality, we assume that for every i ∈ Ag, π(i) , Ir, as Ir can be seen as a special case of ir. We first
construct the tree-unfolding ofM from the state s.
The tree-unfolding ofM from s is an ACGS M∗s = (G
∗, π∗) such that G∗ = (S +, S 0, Ag, (Aci)i∈Ag, (∼∗i )i∈Ag, (P
∗
i
)i∈Ag,∆∗, λ∗),
where
• for every i ∈ Ag, π∗(i) = Ir if π(i) = IR and i ∈ A, otherwise π∗(i) = π(i);
• for every i ∈ Ag and ρ1, ρ2 ∈ S +, ρ1 ∼∗i ρ2, if either lst(ρ1) ∼i lst(ρ2) and π(i) , IR, or ρ1 = ρ2 and π(i) = IR,
• λ∗(ρ) = λ(lst(ρ)) for every ρ ∈ S +;
• P∗
i
(ρ) = Pi(lst(ρ)) for every i ∈ Ag and ρ ∈ S +;
• ∆∗(ρ,~a) = ρ · ∆(lst(ρ), ~a) for every ρ ∈ S +, ~a ∈ Ac.
From the above definition, we can immediately get that the tree-unfoldingM∗q is a tree-like ACGS, namely, every state can
be reached by a unique finite path from the root. IR-strategies of A from s inM correspond exactly to Ir-strategies of A in the
tree unfoldingM∗q from s, while the types of other agents are same under π and π
∗. Thus,M, s |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iffM∗s, s |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ.
Note that this result does not hold if ϕ is a general LTL formula.
Next, we will show thatM′, s |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iffM∗s , s |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ.
(⇒) SupposeM′, s |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, let ξA be the collective strategy such that for every path ρ ∈ OM′ (s, ξA),M′, ρ |= ϕ. Let ξ∗A be
the function such that for every i ∈ A and ρ ∈ S +, ξ∗
A
(i)(ρ) = ξA(i)(lst(ρ)).
First, we show that ξ∗
A
is a collective strategy of A in M∗s. Consider an agent i ∈ A and two states ρ1, ρ2 ∈ S
+ such that
ρ1 ∼
∗
i
ρ2, if π(i) , IR, then lst(ρ1) ∼i lst(ρ2) which implies that ξA(i)(lst(ρ1)) = ξA(i)(lst(ρ2)), hence ξ∗A(i)(ρ1) = ξ
∗
A
(i)(ρ2).
Otherwise ρ1 = ρ2 and π(i) = IR. This implies that ξA(i)(lst(ρ1)) = ξA(i)(lst(ρ2)), hence ξ∗A(i)(ρ1) = ξ
∗
A
(i)(ρ2) as well.
Therefore, ξ∗
A
is a collective strategy of A inM∗s.
Next, we show that for every collective strategy ξ∗
A
of A in M∗s , play(s, ξ
∗
A
, ξ∗
A
) |= ϕ. Suppose play(s, ξ∗
A
, ξ∗
A
) = ρ0ρ1 · · · .
Let ξA be the function such that for every i ∈ A and j ≥ 0, ξA(i)(lst(ρ j)) = ξ
∗
A
(i)(ρ j) if π(i) , IR, otherwise ξA(i)(ρ j) =
ξ∗
A
(i)(ρ0 · · ·ρ j). Consider j, k ≥ 0 such that lst(ρ j) ∼i lst(ρk) for some i ∈ A, if π(i) , IR, then ρ j ∼∗i ρk, which implies that
ξ∗
A
(i)(ρ j) = ξ∗A(i)(ρk), hence ξA(i)(lst(ρ j)) = ξA(i)(lst(ρk)). Otherwise, π(i) = IR, i can choose any action at any state of ρ j.
Thus, ξA is a collective strategy of A inM
′ and play(s, ξA, ξA) = lst(ρ0)lst(ρ1) · · · . The result immediately follows from the
fact that λ∗(ρ) = λ(lst(ρ)) for every ρ ∈ S +.
(⇐) SupposeM∗s, s |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, let ξ
∗
A
be the collective strategy such that for every path ρ ∈ OM∗s (s, ξ
∗
A
),M∗s, ρ |= ϕ. We assume
that there is a total order  on set S +, and denote by min(U) the minimal one of the set of states U ⊆ S + with respect to the
order . Let ξA be the function such that for every i ∈ A and s′ ∈ S , ξA(i)(s′) = ξ∗A(i)(min({ρ ∈ S
+ | lst(ρ) = s′})).
First, we show that ξA is a collective strategy of A inM′. Consider an agent i ∈ A and two states s1, s2 ∈ S such that s1 ∼i s2,
if π(i) , IR, then for each pair of states ρ1, ρ2 ∈ S + such that lst(ρ1) = s1 and lst(ρ2) = s2, we have ρ1 ∼∗i ρ2, which implies
that ξ∗
A
(i)(ρ1) = ξ∗A(i)(ρ2), hence ξA(i)(s1) = ξA(i)(s2). Otherwise s1 = s2 and π(i) = IR. We choose ξA(i)(s1) = ξA(i)(s2) =
ξ∗
A
(i)(min({ρ ∈ S + | lst(ρ) = s1})). Therefore, ξA is a collective strategy of A inM′.
Consider a collective strategy ξA of A in M
′, let ρ = play(s, ξA, ξA), then we have ρ[0..0]ρ[0..1]ρ[0..2] · · · ∈ OM∗s (s, ξ
∗
A
). The
result immediately follows from the fact that λ∗(ρ) = λ(lst(ρ)) for every ρ ∈ S +. ⊓⊔
Recalling that [Alur et al., 2002] observed that both semantics of ATL under Ir-strategies and IR-strategies coincide for
CGS . This result was generalized and formally proved in infinite CGS (i.e., no finiteness with respect to the set of states
and actions) (cf. Proposition 1 [Bulling and Jamroga, 2014]). Proposition 2 can be seen as a generalization of the result
of [Alur et al., 2002] and could be extended to the infinite ACGS similar to [Bulling and Jamroga, 2014].
C Effects of Strategy Types
By restricting all the strategy types to IR, straightforwardly we have:
Proposition 3 Let M = (G, π) be an ACGS where for each i ∈ Ag, π(i) = IR. For each state s of M and ATL∗ formula ϕ,
G, s |=IR ϕ iff M, s |= ϕ.
Proof. By applying structural induction, it suffices to show that the result holds for formulae of the form 〈〈A〉〉φ. By applying
induction hypothesis, for every path ρ, the following holds: G, ρ |=IR ϕ iff M, ρ |= ϕ. For each pair (ξA, υσA) of collective
strategies such that ξA = υσA , OM(s, ξA) = O
σ
G
(s, υσ
A
). Each i ∈ A has same sets of possible IR-strategies in G and M, hence
G, ρ |=IR 〈〈A〉〉φ iffM, ρ |= 〈〈A〉〉φ. ⊓⊔
In light of Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, we shall investigate the effects of strategy types by considering ACGS with
various different setups of strategy types.
Given a set A of agents, for two functions π1, π2 : Ag → Tstr, π1 is coarser than π2 with respect to A, denoted by π1 A π2,
if for every i ∈ A, π1(i) = π2(i) and for every j ∈ A, one of the following conditions holds:
• π1( j) = IR, π2( j) = IR;
• π1( j) = Ir, π2( j) ∈ {IR, Ir};
• π1( j) = iR, π2( j) ∈ {IR, iR};
• π1( j) = ir, π2( j) ∈ {IR, Ir, iR, ir} = Tstr.
Lemma 4 Let A be a set of agents and s be a state of a CGS G. For two functions π1, π2 : Ag → Tstr with π1 A π2, and any
collective strategy ξA of A, we have:
O(G,π1)(s, ξA) ⊆ O(G,π2)(s, ξA).
Lemma 4 reveals the effect of strategy types of A on the outcomes. It is easy to observe that if π2(i) = σ for all i ∈ A, then for
every collective σ-strategy υσ
A
such that ξA = υσA , we have that O(G,π2)(s, ξA) ⊆ O
σ
G
(s, υσ
A
). Moreover, if π2(i) = IR for all i ∈ A,
then O(G,π2)(s, ξA) = O
σ
G
(s, υσ
A
).
An ATL∗ formula ϕ is positive if (1) for each occurrence of 〈〈A〉〉φ in ϕ, φ is an LTL formula, (2) there is no occurrence of
[[A]]φ in ϕ, and (3) negations¬ only appear in front of atomic propositions. For example, 〈〈A〉〉X q is positive, while ¬〈〈A〉〉X q
is not positive. Given a formula ϕ, let Agϕ denote the set of agents that appear in ϕ. By Lemma 4, we have:
Proposition 4 Let G be a CGS, s be a state of G and ϕ be a positive ATL/ATL∗ formula. For π1, π2 : Ag → Tstr such that
π1 Agϕ π2, if (G, π2), s |= ϕ, then (G, π1), s |= ϕ.
Proof. By applying structural induction, it suffices to show that the result holds for formulae of the form 〈〈A〉〉φ. We suppose
(G, π2), s |= 〈〈A〉〉φ, otherwise Item 1 immediately holds.
Since (G, π2), s |= 〈〈A〉〉φ, then there exists a collective strategy ξA of agents A such that for each path ρ ∈ O(G,π2)(s, ξA),
(G, π2), ρ |= φ holds. Since A ⊆ Agϕ and for every i ∈ Agϕ, π1(i) = π2(i) and π1 Agϕ π2, then π1 A π2. By Lemma 4, we get
that O(G,π1)(s, ξA) ⊆ O(G,π2)(s, ξA).
By applying induction hypothesis, for every state formula ψ in φ and state s′ of G, if (G, π2), s′ |= ψ, then (G, π1), s′ |= ψ.
Therefore, for each path ρ ∈ O(G,π1)(s, ξA), we have (G, π1), ρ |= φ. The result follows.
⊓⊔
For positive ATL/ATL∗ formulae ϕ, even if the agents of Agϕ have the same strategy types in ACGS (G, π) and CGS G,
verifying G against ϕ under σ will examine more behavior than verifying (G, π) against ϕ, where i ∈ Agϕ and π(i) = σ.
Therefore, if the behavior of a MAS is exactly modeled as an ACGSM rather than a CGS G with strategy type σ, verifying G
against ϕ under σ may lead to incorrect result. However, more restrictions on strategy types and ATL/ATL∗ formulae can make
them coincide, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5 Let s be a state of M = (G, π) and σ ∈ Tstr be a strategy type. Assume ATL/ATL∗ formula ϕ satisfies (1) for
every i ∈ Agϕ, π(i) = σ, (2) for every i ∈ Ag \ Agϕ, π(i) = IR, and (3) for every occurrence of 〈〈A′〉〉φ in ϕ, Agϕ = A′. Then we
have G, s |=σ ϕ iff M, s |= ϕ.
D More Experimental Results
D.1 Experiment on Dining Cryptographers Protocol
Dining cryptographers protocol is one of anonymity protocols aimed at establishing the privacy of principals during an ex-
change [Lomuscio et al., 2017]. The dining cryptographers protocol can be modeled as MAS. In this game, n cryptographers
share a meal around a circular table. Either one of them or their employer paid for the meal. They are curious whether it was
sponsored by their employer without revealing the identity of the payer (if one of them did pay). The protocol works as follows:
each cryptographer 1) tosses a coin and shows the outcome to his right-hand neighbour, 2) announces whether the two coins
agree or not if he/she is not payer, otherwise announces the opposite of what he/she sees. Their employer is the payer if an
even number of cryptographers claiming that the two coins are different, otherwise not. For experimental purpose, we allow the
cryptographer who paid for the meal announces either the two coins agree or not no matter what he/she saw.
In this experiment, n ranges from 3 to 10, a cryptographer whose is payer and one of other cryptographers use ir-strategies,
the others all use IR-strategies. We verify three formulae ψ1, ψ2 and ψ3, where ψi expresses that if the number of “saydifferent”
Table 2: Results of dining cryptographers protocol
#Crypts #States Lemma 1 Lemma 3
ψ1 ψ2 ψ3 ψ1 ψ2 ψ3
3 160 0.022 0.016 0.013 6.439 5.838 5.852
4 384 0.059 0.049 0.028 6.928 6.744 7.242
5 896 0.133 0.114 0.049 8.839 8.874 8.88
6 2048 0.315 0.328 0.163 12.567 12.724 12.865
7 4608 0.929 1.388 0.382 22.938 23.411 23.654
8 10240 3.463 4.022 0.834 60.642 60.583 63.064
9 22528 9.19 8.913 1.721 266.844 240.003 254.293
10 49152 21.988 21.927 5.094 1712.62 1588.06 1762.88
Table 3: Results of BSS
π
ϕ1 ϕ2
Lemma 1 Lemma 3 SAT Lemma 1 Lemma 3 SAT
(IR, IR) 4.237 11.264 Y 0.08 5.566 Y
(IR, Ir) 4.102 12.185 Y 0.081 5.124 Y
(IR, ir) 4.094 11.459 Y 0.081 5.26 Y
(Ir, IR) 4.095 17.398 Y 0.081 6.096 Y
(Ir, Ir) 4.086 30.649 Y 0.082 7.183 Y
(Ir, ir) 4.112 32.985 Y 0.082 8.009 Y
(ir, IR) 4.162 17.842 N 0.082 5.96 Y
(ir, Ir) 4.144 31.155 N 0.082 7.592 Y
(ir, ir) 4.157 30.73 N 0.082 7.473 Y
is odd and the i-th cryptographer is not the payer, then he/she knows that the bill is paid by one of the others, but cannot tell
exactly who is the payer. For instance, in the three cryptographers case,
ψ1 ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉G((odd ∧ ¬c1paid)→ ((Kc1(c2paid ∨ c3paid)) ∧ ¬Kc1c2paid ∧ ¬Kc1c3paid)).
The results are shown in Table 2, where column 1 gives the number of cryptographers, column 2 gives the number of states,
columns 3–5 (resp. columns 6–7) show the total time of respectively verifying ψ1, ψ2 and ψ3 using Lemma 1 (resp. Lemma 3).
Both ψ1 and ψ2 are satisfied by all the models, while ψ3 not. We observe that Lemma 1 is more efficient than Lemma 3, as the
coalitions in all the formulae are ∅. From this experiment, one may conclude the reasonable scalability of our tool.
D.2 Experiment on Book Store Scenario (BSS)
The BSS model depicts a deal between two agents: a supplier (S) and a purchaser (P) [Lomuscio et al., 2017]. Initially, S is
waiting for an order from P, and P is ready for initiating a trade. Upon receiving an order of some e-good from P, S can make a
decision whether accepts the order or not do, and later notify P. If S accepts, then P can pay fee. Once paid, S can either reject
the payment or accept and deliver the good. If P received the good, then trade is completed. During the trade, P can revoke the
order, both S and P can terminate the trade, after which the information of the trade should be symmetric at any time. In this
model, the S has 15 local states and 13 actions, and P has 12 local states and 7 actions. In this experiment, we verify the model
against the following formulae.
ϕ1 ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉G((S&P no T )→ (KS 〈〈{S , P}〉〉F trade end))
expresses that “if neither S nor P terminates the trade (i.e., S&P no T is ture), then S knows that they can cooperatively
complete the trade eventually” always holds.
ϕ2 ≡ 〈〈{S , P}〉〉(S&P no T U(trade end ∧ ¬trade success))
expresses that the trade can ends by P asking for refund.
The results are shown in Table 3. Each row presents the result of one of strategy type combinations of S and P, for instance,
(IR, ir) denotes that S has an IR-strategy while P has ir-strategy. Columns 2-4 (resp. columns 5-7) show total time and result
of verifying ϕ1 (resp. ϕ2) using Lemma 1 (resp. Lemma 3). The results of ϕ1 confirm that strategy types affect the truth of
formulae. Lemma 1 performs better than Lemma 3 both on ϕ1 and ϕ2 in this experiment.
